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Abstract: One reason often put forward for South Korea’s rapid economic growth has been
the rising level of educational attainment of its workforce. Correspondingly, the proportion
of Koreans who complete tertiary education has also rapidly increased (and is also
considerably higher than the OECD average). Such increases raise the possibility of
overeducation if the amount of jobs which require such education do not increase at a
similar pace. Among the consequences of overeducation are reduced life satisfaction and
underutilised human capital. Given that Korean females are better educated than males, and
they also face more discrimination in the labour market, the consequences of overeducation
are likely to differ by gender. Using Korean panel data and both a subjective and objective
measure of overeducation, the results are consistent with females having lower aspirations
despite their high levels of education, and indicate that a more female friendly labour
market could address the country’s currently underutilised human capital, for the benefit of
the females themselves, as well as males, and the Korean economy.
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“Seungyeon always said girls don’t need special treatment – they just want the same
responsibilities and opportunities. Instead of choosing the lunch menu, they want to
run for president.”
Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982, Nam-Joo, 2020, p. 78
1 Introduction
In the past few decades South Korea has experienced rapid economic growth, managing to
transform itself from a developing country to a developed country in less than 50 years.1
Currently it is the fourth largest economy in Asia behind China, Japan and India. This
transformation has attracted the attention of many scholars who have been interested in
the underlying factors (Park, 2011; Lee, 2012; Cho, 2019; Lee and Lee, 2019). According to
this literature, a key factor that has contributed to Korea’s economic development and
growth is education (Piazolo, 1995; Lee, 2000). Education has been argued to have
accelerated growth and development through the improvement of labour force quality,
productivity, and innovativeness (Lee, 2000; Bak, 2018). Particularly, as Figure 1 shows, in
Korea the number of individuals who complete higher education has more than doubled in
recent years and was in 2018 at 69.6 % of all individuals aged between 25 and 34,
significantly exceeding the OECD average of 44.5 % (OECD, 2020).2 This trend is similar for
males and females, although the rate has always been higher for women in Korea (75.7 % in
2018) than men (64.1 %), a gap similar to the OECD average (50.8% females compared with
38.5% males). Given this, and the often-recorded discrimination of females in Korea and the
Korean labour market, gender is an important consideration.
1 In common with much of the academic literature, in the remainder of this article we will refer to South Korea
as Korea.
2 Statistics also show that participation and completion at levels of education lower than tertiary have also
increased over the same time period (World Bank, 2020a, 2020b).
3Figure 1:Development of Tertiary Education Attainment in Korea and the OECD between
1997 and 2018 (OECD, 2020).
With the increase in higher education participation, one phenomenon that has gained
attention is that of overeducation (see e.g. Sicherman, 1991; Chevalier, 2003; Piper, 2015).
Overeducation occurs when a rapid expansion in higher education has not been met with a
corresponding increase in the demand for highly educated labour (Patrinos, 1997; Belfield,
2000; Piper, 2015; Delaney et al., 2020). Overeducation has been demonstrated to be a
significant societal problem as well as an individual one: with overeducated individuals
having been found to be less innovative (Länsisalmi et al., 2004; Agut et al., 2009); have
lower job satisfaction and the companies they work for experience a higher turnover (Tsang,
1987; Alba-Ramírez, 1991; Tsang et al., 1991; Sloane et al., 1999; Park and Shahiri, 2015;
Verhaest and Verhofstadt, 2016) and a general underutilisation of human capital. As well as
being associated with lower life satisfaction (Artés et al., 2014; Piper, 2015; Frank and Hou,
2018), a study of overeducated Swedes even found that they have a higher mortality rate
than the non-overeducated (Garcy, 2015).
In Korea, a high incidence of overeducation seems likely, as the number of jobs that require
a high level of education has not caught up with the increasing rate of graduates of tertiary
education programmes (Ministry of Education, 2017). This problem is intensified by the fact
that the Korean market is dominated by ten large conglomerates (including Samsung and
Hyundai), which have managed to grow without creating many jobs for graduates of tertiary
education (Yang and Kim, 2019). The authors have further illustrated this by quoting Ban Ga-
4woon, who stated that “South Korea is paying the price for its overprotection of top-tier jobs
and education fervor that produced a flood of people wanting only that small number of top
jobs” (Yang and Kim, 2019). In an attempt to tackle this imbalance, a continual effort to
generate better opportunities for ‘jobless graduates’ has been underway. As just one well-
known example, the former president (2013-2017) of South Korea, Geun-hye Park, has
designed the ‘K-Move’ programme, which aims to support thousands of graduates in seeking
a job abroad, offering overseas training and aid for overseas business start-ups (Kim, 2018).
Recent statistics presented in a news report by Yang and Kim (2019) indicate that, as of 2018,
around 6,000 Korean graduates work overseas with such government help.
When Koreans fail to find a job that matches their education abroad or in Korea, they are
likely to settle for a job that is below their educational level (i.e. that they are overeducated
for) to avoid unemployment. According to a recent study by H. Kim et al. (2016), it appears
that this is a route that many Korean graduates take. The authors reported that almost 20%
of employed college graduates are working in jobs that do not match their level of
education.3 In a Western context, a growing body of research has begun to explore potential
consequences for overeducated individuals, including their income and well-being (see e.g.
Bracke et al., 2013; Haisken-DeNew and Kleibrink, 2013; Piper, 2015; Frank and Hou, 2018).
Such issues have, until now, received little academic attention in the context of Korea even
though there are strong reasons suggesting that overeducation might be an important
phenomenon (Cho and Lee, 2014). In Korean society, Confucian core ideals such as
education, hard work, and respect for family are deeply embedded (Berthrong and
Berthrong, 2000; Kim, 2009). As such there is a belief that a high level of educational
attainment guarantees a successful life and future in terms of social status, employment and
income (Ministry of Education, 2017). However, as a consequence, when this is not fulfilled
for overeducated Koreans, they are expected to be less satisfied with life. Korean parents
usually invest large sums of money into their children’s education and they closely monitor
their children’s academic performance, expecting high achievements (Kim and Bang, 2017).
These high expectations cause more stress for the students (Kim and Lee, 2013; S. Park et al.,
2018). In light of these findings, there are many reasons to believe that Korean graduates,
3 This figure is broadly similar to that in many other countries though, as the next section explains, the
incidence of overeducation depends upon how it is measured.
5who have gone through stressful years in college and school, will be significantly affected by
not obtaining a job that matches their level of education. Our investigation assesses this via
the prism of life satisfaction, while considering the important role of income for the
overeducation-life satisfaction relationship.
Importantly, for the case of Korea, it is likely that there are some gender differences
regarding the link between overeducation and life satisfaction, and the moderating role
played by income. These relate to the different patterns of labour market participation of
the genders, and the gender pay gap which is the largest within all OECD member states
(OECD, 2017). Given that 90% of legislators, senior officials and managers in Korea are men
(World Economic Forum, 2019), it is conceivable that women are used to ‘worse’ jobs, have
lower expectations, and thus might be less affected by lower life satisfaction due to
overeducation than men.4 The Global Gender Gap Report 2020 published by the World
Economic Forum (2019) shows that Korea has a high gender inequality in economic
participation and opportunity as well as political empowerment, ranking 108th out of 153
countries in the Global Gender Gap Index. Additionally, in the ‘environment for working
women’-indicator of the Glass-Ceiling-Index published by The Economist (2020) Korea has
ranked bottom for eight years in a row. Since Korean women have higher levels of
educational attainment than men, this could be regarded as a waste of economic resources
and human capital (OECD, 2017). These gender differences are discussed further in
subsection 2.1, after a brief introduction regarding the definition and measurement of
overeducation. Subsection 2.2 and 2.3 report on the academic literature regarding
overeducation and income, and overeducation and life satisfaction, respectively. Section 3
describes the data and methods used, section 4 presents the results, section 5 the discussion
and limitations of our work and section 6 concludes.
4 A similar argument has been made in a job satisfaction context by Bender et al. (2005). Due to social norms,
especially in female dominated workplaces, women tend to report a higher job satisfaction than men as they
have relatively low expectations to begin with. Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982: “It didn't occur to the child Jiyoung that
her brother was receiving special treatment, and so she wasn't even jealous. That's how it had always been”
(Nam-Joo, 2020, p. 15).
62 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
2.1 The Concept of Overeducation
Overeducation, also referred to as overschooling or educational mismatch, has been
“defined as the difference between a worker’s attained or completed level of schooling and
the level of schooling required for the job the worker holds” (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011,
p. 9). An issue investigated for several decades, one of the earliest discussions was about
overeducated Americans by Richard Freeman in 1976. Since then, as an increasing number
of people participate in higher education, the topic of overeducation has become even more
relevant. In general, the academic literature distinguishes between four different
approaches to measuring overeducation (Verhaest and Omey, 2006). Two of these
approaches are subjective: direct self-assessment, and indirect self-assessment. The other
two are objective: job analysis, and the statistical ‘realised matches’ method.
The first two ways of measurement, direct and indirect self-assessment, rely on self-reports
of individuals. Direct self-assessment is the worker’s perception of how their level of
education compares with the educational requirements of their job, the indirect self-
assessment asks workers about the educational level required for their occupation (either
based on the required level to do or to get the job) which is then compared to the education
they actually have. In contrast, job analysis and realised matches do not involve asking the
worker about their job. Job analysis involves job analysts stating the educational level firms
require for a given position within occupational classifications. In contrast, the realised
matches method is statistical, and compares the years of education an individual has to the
average level of education of workers within the same industry or occupation (or a
combination of both). Individuals are considered overeducated if they have more education
than this average by some statistical distance (usually one standard deviation; Verhaest and
Omey, 2006). An advantage of the Korean data we use, and thus our study, is the ability to
measure overeducation using both a subjective measure, direct self-assessment, and an
objective measure, realised matches.
Most studies rely on just one of the four measures, often because of data constraints.
Verhaest and Omey (2006) is a rare exception that investigates all four measurements of
overeducation using SONAR data of Flemish school leavers. They found that the effects of
overeducation and the conclusions drawn from this clearly depend on how it is measured.
7Moreover, in an earlier meta-analysis of 25 European and American studies, Groot and
Maassen van den Brink (2000) found that, compared to the other measurements, the
realised matches approach gives lower estimates of educational mismatches. More recently,
Clark et al. (2017) found that overeducation is not just a short-term phenomenon with
overeducation persisting twelve years after labour market entry. They also found that
women in the US are about 5 to 13% more likely to be overeducated than men. The
arguments they give for this finding are that female workers might attach more importance
to the compatibility of job and family, and therefore accept jobs that do not fit their
educational level, as well as the direct discrimination of women in the labour market (Clark
et al., 2017). These issues are likely to be of particular importance for understanding the
Korean labour market as well as the consequences of its conditions, as discussed below, and
to justify our choice to investigate genders separately.
Previous work investigating overeducation in Korea is scarce. Using the 2005 Korean
National Follow-up Survey of College and Graduate School Graduates on Economic Activity
with data from 12,666 individuals who graduated in 2003 and the indirect self-assessment to
measure worker’s overeducation, H. Kim et al. (2016) found that in Korea 70.4% of the
sample worked in a job that matches their education whereas 17.4% of the workers were
overqualified. In addition, they found that both two-year Korean female college graduates
and female workers with graduate degrees were more likely to be matched (and thus not
overeducated) than equivalent males (H. Kim et al., 2016). Our results below suggest that if
overeducation was measured objectively this outcome might be reversed.
Similarly, a study of the Japanese labour market by Kucel et al. (2016) using the indirect self-
assessment measure could not find a significant relationship between the female gender and
overeducation, and could therefore not confirm that Japanese women are more likely to be
overeducated than men. One explanation is that women tend to understate their actual job
expectations, and, as a result, their overall level of overeducation. Again, it follows that,
when measured subjectively, overeducated women report to be adequately educated,
though they may not be (Kucel et al., 2016). Occupational crowding may also play a role here,
with female graduates working with other female graduates disproportionately in non-
graduate jobs. This may also explain why in the study of H. Kim et al. (2016), more men self-
report being overeducated than women. However, if measured using objective approaches
(realised matches or job analysis), more women are expected
8suffering from labour market discrimination and societal norms about family life.5 These
observations further highlight the importance of considering both subjective and objective
measures of overeducation.
2.2 Overeducation and Income
A key area of interest regarding the overeducated has been with respect to their income.
The income of the overeducated can be compared to those with the same level of education
but in matched employment, and secondly, to those in similar employment but matched (i.e.
lower) education. Previous studies have established that overqualified workers earn more
money than their colleagues who are adequately educated for the similar job. However, the
overeducated also earn less money than individuals with the same schooling working in a job
that matches their education (see, for example, Sicherman, 1991; Lin and Wang, 2005;
Verhaest and Omey, 2006). Using both pooled OLS estimates and fixed effects regressions,
Bauer (2002) found that overeducated (measured by the realised matches method) German
males earn 10.6% less than their peers who have the same level of education but work in a
job that matches their education. Verhaest and Omey (2006), using the four measurements
of overeducation presented above, found some differences regarding overeducation and
wages, though all indicate a significant negative relationship when comparing overeducated
workers to appropriately educated workers with the same educational level. Furthermore, in
their longitudinal study, Clark et. al (2017) found that although additional years of schooling
are associated with higher wages, the rate of return for additional years of schooling that
surpass the job requirements is only approximately a third the size of the return associated
with additional years of schooling that match the required level.
In Korea, H. Kim et al. (2016) found that the subjectively overeducated earn less than
workers whose degree matches the one required by their job, and that the amount differs
between the genders: men earn 4.48% less and women 7.24% less. K. Park et al. (2018),
5 In particular, the labour supply of females is posited to follow an ‘M curve’ (J. Kim et al., 2016). This shows
that their participation in the labour market decreases during the late 20s and early 30s (because they are
having children and Korea has a lack of good and affordable childcare facilities), increases mainly during the 40s
and decreases again at the end of their working life. Therefore, for the majority of Korean women, it is
expected that they will leave the labour market again after some years resulting in the fact that, once they start
working, they already know that this is only a temporary situation. Clark et al. (2017) also suggest that a
woman’s overeducation can be partly explained by her role as a mother.
9using a sample of 2,832 working Korean doctorate holders from the Korean survey of
Careers and Mobility of Doctorate Holders (KCDH), find that approximately 44% reported to
be subjectively overeducated, and also found a wage penalty: overeducated doctorate
holders earn approximately 6.5% less than those in a job that matches their schooling.
Additionally, they found that female doctorate holders in Korea earn approximately 11.1%
less than male Koreans with doctoral degree (K. Park et al., 2018). Given the statistics about
participation in higher education in Korea (see section 1) and the findings of previous studies,
gender forms a part of our investigation. The next subsection discusses overeducation and
life satisfaction both generally and in the Korean context.
2.3 Overeducation and Life Satisfaction
In the last few years there has been interest in the relationship between overeducation and
life satisfaction. Using the indirect self-assessment method and two waves of the European
Social Survey, Artés et al. (2014) found a significant negative effect of overeducation on life
satisfaction by comparing the overeducated with individuals that have a similar educational
level and are not overeducated. An argument presented for this finding is that education
raises expectations which, for the overeducated, are not met in comparison to the non-
overeducated. Similarly, using the realised matches objective method and several waves of
British panel data, Piper (2015) found a negative relationship between overeducation and
life satisfaction which became less pronounced for later cohorts. Thus, as overeducation
became more prevalent in the UK (due mainly to the expansion of participation in higher
education), being overeducated became less damaging to well-being: a result potentially
attributable to changing comparison effects and social norms.
For well-being generally, relative comparisons have been found to be important (Senik, 2005;
Clark et al., 2008) and been argued to be a main pathway through which overeducation
affects life satisfaction (Piper, 2015; Yin, 2015). If individuals compare themselves to others
who have a lower level of education, but work in similar employment positions, they are
likely to be dissatisfied. When investing time and money into the attainment of a degree,
individuals expect that this will bring about benefits in the future. However, when these
hoped-for benefits are not obtained, individuals may be disappointed about the lack of
returns for their investment in their human capital. This disappointment should be seen in
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lower life satisfaction. As the Introduction makes clear, such a situation is likely to be
prevalent for the overeducated in Korea.
The negative relationship between overeducation and life satisfaction is also found by
Salinas-Jiménez et al. (2016) who, similar to Artés et al. (2014), used data from the European
Social Survey. They extended the analysis using a quantile regression model, and found that
being overeducated, again measured by indirect self-assessment, is negatively associated
with life satisfaction and that there are differences across the distribution. Notably, at the
top of the happiness distribution, education effects are lower (Salinas-Jiménez et al., 2016).
Additionally, in a study that uses ESS data from the working population of 25 European
countries (N=19,089), overeducated workers (measured using both objective methods) seem
to be more depressed than the workers with a matched educational level for their
occupation (Bracke et al., 2013). Using both the realised matches and the job analysis
method, the authors observed higher levels of depressive symptoms for overeducated
individuals. Verhaest and Omey (2006) found that the overeducated were less satisfied with
life and less likely to engage in training.
While, as far as we can tell, there is no academic literature about overeducation and life
satisfaction in the Korean context – our work is seemingly the first – there is potentially
relevant evidence on Korean adolescents who are undertaking education. Park and Huebner
(2005), for example, found that Korean students are less satisfied with life than US students,
and that the contribution of the school satisfaction domain to global life satisfaction is higher
for Korean adolescents. As explained in the Introduction, traditional Confucianism sees
education as a key variable for success and results in high educational pressure on Korean
students. Since education is an important determinant of Korean individuals’ life satisfaction,
it is expected that overeducated Korean graduates who recently finished their education
face the same situation as these Korean adolescents and are thus likely to be less happy
because they cannot adequately use the education for which they have invested a significant
amount of time, finance and effort. For these reasons, and those mentioned above, we
expect overeducated Koreans to be less satisfied with life than the non-overeducated.
As indicated in section 2.1, we expect gender differences in the size of the negative
relationship between being overeducated and life satisfaction. Given cultural expectations,
social norms, the ‘M-curve’ and other trends in labour market participation we expect
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overeducation to be more distressing to men. Confucian cultures such as the Korean one are
known for male dominance which gives Korean men greater privileges and opportunities. As
a result, Korean men report higher life satisfaction than women (Park and Huebner, 2005).
However, because their privileges and opportunities are likely to be key contributors to their
life satisfaction, working in a job that does not fulfil their high expectations and aspirations
and does not allow them to make use of their educational level makes them likely to be even
less happy than women. This can also be argued using the social comparison theory. Based
on social comparison theory, as men usually dominate higher job positions in Korea, they are
also likely to compare themselves to those working in higher job positions (Lee, 2017). The
fact that the Korean labour market is dominated by men makes it even more difficult for
them not to suffer under their mismatching job position. Given that Korea has a large gender
pay gap, it is conceivable that income may ameliorate the subjective well-being penalty of
being overeducated more for males than it does females. Our empirical analysis takes this
into consideration.
3. Data and Methods used
The data for our investigation come from the Korean Labour and Income Panel Study (KLIPS).
Commencing in 1998, KLIPS is an annual longitudinal study covering approximately 10,000
individuals in each wave.6 In nearly all waves individuals are asked about their education,
employment situation, income, life satisfaction, and many socio-economic factors, meaning
the dataset is fruitful for many quantitative investigations. For our investigation one major
advantage is that the data enables measurement of overeducation in both a subjective and
an objective way. As the literature review demonstrates, how overeducation is measured
can affect the incidence of overeducation and subsequent associations with income and life
satisfaction. For the subjective measure, we make use of a question where individuals are
directly asked whether they think that, in comparison to the level of education that they
have, the level of their current work is (very) low, well-matched, or (very) high on a five-
point scale. In our analysis, everyone who reports their level of work as low or very low
perceives themselves as overeducated.
6 Please see https://www.kli.re.kr/klips_eng/index.do for more information and access to the data.
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Our objective overeducation measure relies on the ‘realised matches’ way of measuring
education. We use information from KLIPS about an individual’s highest qualification, and
attach a years of ISCED schooling value to this using the method that UNESCO recommends.7
Following this, we calculate a mean and standard deviation of years of schooling for each
combination of occupation and industry category. Individuals are then classed as
overeducated if they have more than one standard deviation of education above the
average for their employment group (i.e. their particular occupation-industry combination).8
This is one of the typical ways of calculating ‘realised matches’ overeducation, however
given the increase in education generally over the life of our data, we also create an
overeducation variable based on a particular occupation-industry-year combination. We
show present descriptives and results from the more traditional measure below, though
these are supported by this alternative calculation (available upon request). Life Satisfaction
is measured on a five-point scale with respondents stating whether they are very satisfied
(recoded as 5), satisfied (4), neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (3), dissatisfied (2) or very
dissatisfied (1). Income is individual after-tax income deflated by the CPI, though if pre-tax
income is considered, or household income, the results presented below are almost identical.
Table 1 below presents descriptive statistics.
In the present analysis, we only consider individuals who are 35 years old or younger
(however the results below are substantially the same without this restriction) for the
following reasons: the rise in participation in the higher education sector in Korea is a recent
phenomenon thus affecting younger people; the age restriction also makes the comparison
group more realistic – for example, a 30 year old is unlikely to compare themselves to a 50
year old; and studies that consider the whole of working life and use the realised matches
approach often conflate individuals changing their job with a change regarding whether they
become overeducated or stop being overeducated.9 Regarding the latter point, after a
certain age, individuals rarely increase their level of formal education and thus changes in
the realised matches overeducation measure capture changes of industry and occupation
7 Details are here: http://uis.unesco.org/en/isced-mappings
8 Note well, with this measure, we exclude individuals who report no formal schooling who would otherwise be
automatically classed as being overeducated. However, given our age restriction (discussed in the next
paragraph) this is of negligible importance.
9 The youngest worker in our sample is 15, though only 0.05% of our sample is under 18 years old.
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category. This conflation issue is particularly a problem when studies rely on fixed effects
estimation, with its focus on changes for each individual.10 This partly explains our
methodological choice explained below.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the overeducated and non-overeducated. KLIPS data 2002-
2015.
(1. Subjective measure) (2. Objective measure)
Overeducated Non-overeducated Overeducated
Non-
overeducated
Life Satisfaction (1-5) 3.22 3.44 3.52 3.41
Years of Schooling
(ISECD)
13.83 13.92 16.82 13.57
Real Disposable
Income,
2036.19 2586.55 2821.75 2447.43
Female 35.7% 42.0% 28.8% 43.2%
Male 64.3% 58.0% 71.2% 56.8%
Age 28.5 29.5 30.0 29.4
Single 62.8% 53.9% 54.9% 55.8%
Married 35.7% 45.0% 44.6% 42.9%
Separated 0.4% 0.2% 0.08% 0.2%
Divorced 0.9% 0.8% 0.4% 0.1%
Widowed 0.07% 0.04% 0% 0.04%
Note: Life satisfaction is positively coded; real disposable income is annual and measured in units of
10,000 Won (which is about 7.5 euros); years of schooling is the standard ISECD measure; the rest are
binary variables.
A comparison between those who consider themselves overeducated and those that do not
(i.e. the first two columns) reveals that the subjectively overeducated are, on average, less
satisfied with life. They also earn considerably less money, and are less likely to be married.
Both groups have a very similar average amount of schooling. In contrast, the objectively
overeducated are slightly more satisfied with life, on average, than the non-objectively
overeducated (columns 3 and 4). This is in contrast to the discussion in section 2.3, however
10 Furthermore, as Chadi and Hetschko (2016) show, there is often a honeymoon effect with new jobs that can
result in higher life satisfaction. Dependent upon whether a change in job categorises someone as moving from
being overeducated to matched or vice versa, the honeymoon effect can bias the result.
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the objectively overeducated also, on average, receive considerably more income: a
potential reason for the finding of higher average life satisfaction. The overeducated –
expected given how it is measured – have, on average, more years of schooling. Gender, age,
and marital status reveal no noteworthy differences between the two groups.11 Comparing
the subjectively overeducated and objectively overrated reveals that the subjectively
overeducated report less life satisfaction and receive less income; once again indicating that
income will be an important control variable for the overeducation-life satisfaction
relationship.
Table 2 provides averages for real after tax income by gender and all, and the differences in
income for the genders and demonstrates descriptive evidence for some of the arguments
made in sections 1 and 2. Furthermore, the averages in our sample reflect official statistics
for the average incomes of females and males in Korea.
Table 2:Mean (and standard deviation) of annual real after tax income, 10,000 South
Korean Won. KLIPS data 1998-2015.
(1. Females)
Real after tax income
(2. Males)
Real after tax income
(3. All)
Real after tax income
Subjectively
overeducated
1695.76 (1167.76) 2207.46 (1303.04) 2036.19 (1282.17)
Subjectively not
overeducated
2088.96 (1184.14) 2927.85 (1636.40) 2586.55 (1525.96)
Objectively
overeducated
2240.78 (1366.33) 3049.88 (1788.09) 2821.75 (1718.72)
Objectively not
overeducated
2016.08 (1169.20) 2756.40 (1576.19) 2447.43 (1466.71)
Table 2 shows that, in all four categories, females receive substantially less real income after
tax than males.12 Our discussion above suggests that, controlling for income (and other
commonly control variables in life satisfaction estimations), the expected negative
11 The descriptive statistics indicate that there is also no difference between the overeducated and not
overeducated for health status. However, health status is only available in many waves of the dataset as a
subjective measure and is not included in our analysis. Some scholars claim that subjective health, in a
subjective well-being context, falls into the category of a bad control (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). All results
presented, however, are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of subjective health status.
12 Information about whether an individual works full or part-time only appears in a few of the later waves, so
it is not included in our analysis. The vast majority of workers interviewed as part of this survey are full-time.
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association of being overeducated with life satisfaction will be lower for females. However,
not controlling for income may change this picture given the much lower average wages
females earn. Table 2 also shows that the average income for subjectively (objectively)
overeducated people are lower (higher) than those who are not. Thus, it is conceivable that
individuals deciding that they have too much education for their job might be responding to
what they consider to be their low pay; certainly, as Table 1 shows, the subjectively
overeducated and not subjectively overeducated have, on average, only a negligible
difference with their actual years of schooling (despite the large pay differentials). Also
noteworthy is the finding that the objectively overeducated have more income than the
objectively not overeducated, as well as having more income on average than the
subjectively overeducated. These substantial income differences highlight the importance to
not just relying on subjective measures and to carefully consider the role of income in any
investigation of overeducation.
Ideally, for our estimation technique we would exploit the longitudinal nature of the dataset.
However, with one exception we are unable to. With the realised matches measure of
overeducation, there is not enough ‘within’ a person change: individuals rarely move from
not being overeducated to being overeducated or back. One solution to a lack of within
variation is to employ dynamic panel estimation techniques like System General Method of
Moments (GMM). The obtained coefficients from this estimator fully support the results
presented below, though the diagnostic testing of the models indicate that much caution is
necessary if used for this investigation.13 As a consequence, for all of the estimates for
objective overeducation we use ordered probit analysis taking account of the ordinal nature
of the dependent variable, even if we cannot take into account individual unobserved
heterogeneity (for reasons just given). We present the coefficients obtained by the
estimations and the key marginal effects calculated post-estimation. For comparison
purposes, we employ the same method for the subjective measure of overeducation too.
Given that there is sufficient ‘within’ variation with the subjective measure, we first assess
this via fixed effects analysis, and then proceed to the ordered probit estimations of both
measures of overeducation. Due to the importance of income (see Table 2), we undertake –
13 The obtained coefficients reveal that realised matches overeducation is negative and significant (for the main
model the coefficient is -0.138, with the z-statistic being -8.41), but the diagnostic testing of the models is not
supportive of its use for this investigation.
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for each measure of overeducation – two estimations: one that controls for income and one
that does not.14
4. Results
Table 3 presents the results from fixed effects estimation for the subjective measure of
overeducation. There are two columns for each group: all, female and male. The first column
for each group does not control for individual income, whereas the other column does.
Importantly, our subjective overeducation variable captures changes of how an individual
perceives their level of work compared to the education they have: As the first paragraph of
section 3 states, individuals are subjectively overeducated if they rate the level of work
comparison as low or very low.
Table 3: Fixed effect coefficients from Korean Panel data. KLIPS data 2002-2016.
(1. All) (2. All) (3. Females) (4. Females) (5. Males) (6. Males)
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Subjectively
overeducated
-0.084***
(0.010)
-0.070***
(0.011)
-0.059***
(0.017)
-0.021
(0.019)
-0.097***
(0.012)
-0.095***
(0.014)
Years of
Schooling
0.011
(0.008)
0.005
(0.009)
0.009
(0.011)
0.005
(0.013)
0.011
(0.012)
0.007
(0.013)
Real pre-tax
Income
0.004***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.004***
(0.000)
Age 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.080** 0.074* 0.074** 0.070**
(0.022) (0.025) (0.034) (0.038) (0.030) (0.034)
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married 0.160*** 0.175*** 0.184*** 0.190*** 0.144*** 0.164***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.025) (0.019) (0.021)
Separated -0.013 -0.026 0.196 0.233* -0.280* -0.373**
14 We also undertake all of the objective overeducation estimations again, narrowing down the comparator
group to members of the same sex (as well as occupation-industry combination), though, as Table 5 shows, this
does not make much difference to the results obtained.
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(0.094) (0.101) (0.124) (0.133) (0.143) (0.153)
Divorced -0.102* -0.109* -0.040 -0.074 -0.154* -0.133
(0.053) (0.059) (0.071) (0.081) (0.079) (0.087)
Widowed -0.535 -0.488 -0.516 -0.481
(0.372) (0.367) (0.371) (0.366)
Constant 1.615*** 1.823*** 1.395*** 1.879*** 2.541*** 2.147***
(0.401) (0.408) (0.327) (0.395) (0.427) (0.537)
Observations 28,433 23,480 11,588 9,233 16,845 14,247
Individuals 6,848 5,920 3,010 2,518 3,838 3,402
R-squared 0.038 0.036 0.047 0.044 0.035 0.037
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Income unit is 1,000,000
Won (about 750 euros). Reference category: single. Region and year controls included.
For everyone together and males separately, subjective overeducation is associated with
lower life satisfaction. However, for females the situation is less clear cut and supports the
speculation based on the descriptive statistics in Table 2: the dissatisfaction that females
report with the level of their job compared to their education level, may reflect their
relatively low salary, at least in part. When real disposable income is not controlled for
(column 3), subjectively overeducated females are less happy than females who do not
report being overeducated for their jobs. However, this difference is no longer significant
when income is controlled for (column 4).15 Thus, income does seem to play a role in the
judgement of Korean females regarding the requirement of their job compared to their
education level. For males, even though Table 2 shows us that the subjectively overeducated
have substantially less income than the subjectively not-overeducated, income does not
modify the overeducation-life satisfaction relationship. Therefore, for subjective
overeducation in Korea we uncover a substantial gender difference.16 We now turn to the
objective realised matches variable, which only has a low positive correlation with this
subjective measure (approximately 0.1). This may be, partly, a result of occupational
crowding, gender discrimination and resulting societal norms.
15 Caution is necessary with this conclusion however, because when ordered probit estimation is used – see
Table A1 in the Appendix – subjectively overeducated female Koreans are still less satisfied with life, when
income is taken into account, than those who do not consider themselves overeducated.
16 The changes between the columns for the constant term may be indicative of the gender inequalities
discussed in sections 1 and 2 and support the gender based findings and arguments of Park and Huebner
(2005).
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Table 4 presents ordered probit analysis regarding life satisfaction and investigates objective
overeducation. The columns follow the same pattern as in Table 3, and given the higher level
of income of the objectively overeducated we are looking at two things: are the
overeducated less satisfied with life than those not overeducated; and does the higher
income compensate for any life satisfaction penalty due to being overeducated (if such a
penalty is found).17
Table 4: Life Satisfaction and Objective Overeducation. Ordered Probit Analysis Results.
KLIPS data 2002-2016.
(1. All) (2. All) (3. Females) (4. Females) (5. Males) (6. Males)
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Objectively
overeducated
-0.322***
(0.025)
-0.306***
(0.028)
-0.222***
(0.045)
-0.180***
(0.051)
-0.342***
(0.032)
-0.307***
(0.036)
Years of
Schooling
0.157***
(0.004)
0.136***
(0.005)
0.141***
(0.007)
0.114***
(0.008)
0.164***
(0.006)
0.124***
(0.007)
Real Income 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.163*** 0.127*** 0.204*** 0.140*** 0.178*** 0.164***
(0.023) (0.029) (0.035) (0.043) (0.034) (0.043)
Age squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.512*** 0.465*** 0.444*** 0.456*** 0.544*** 0.462***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.029) (0.032) (0.022) (0.025)
Separated -0.438*** -0.418** -0.205 -0.138 -0.900*** -0.983***
(0.159) (0.166) (0.205) (0.216) (0.251) (0.263)
Divorced -0.267*** -0.312*** -0.265*** -0.296*** -0.379*** -0.508***
(0.073) (0.078) (0.096) (0.104) (0.116) (0.121)
Widowed -0.804** -0.762* -0.698 -0.644 -1.291 -1.178
(0.395) (0.420) (0.452) (0.492) (0.795) (0.795)
17 Additionally controlling for mother and father's education has almost no impact on the results presented
here (and in the previous table).
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Constant cut1 -0.035 -0.736 1.052 -0.429 -0.147 -0.272
(0.470) (0.573) (0.715) (0.934) (0.644) (0.785)
Constant cut2 1.284*** 0.613 2.341*** 1.006 1.203* 1.058
(0.467) (0.569) (0.710) (0.925) (0.641) (0.781)
Constant cut3 3.365*** 2.720*** 4.377*** 3.077*** 3.330*** 3.211***
(0.467) (0.569) (0.711) (0.925) (0.641) (0.782)
Constant cut4 5.973*** 5.427*** 7.012*** 5.816*** 5.932*** 5.929***
(0.468) (0.570) (0.713) (0.927) (0.642) (0.783)
Observations 27,814 23,106 11,405 9,173 16,409 13,933
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table 3 note.
Ceteris paribus, Table 4 reveals that the more years of schooling a Korean individual has, the
more satisfied with their life they are. However, controlling for this, if they are overeducated
they are less satisfied than those who are ‘matched’ with respect to their education and job.
With and without the income control, based on the size and confidence intervals of the
coefficients obtained for objective overeducation, males, as expected, suffer a greater
happiness penalty than females. Thus, the higher income of the objectively overeducated
(see Table 2) does not seem to offer much compensation in terms of life satisfaction.18
Table 5:Marginal effects post ordered probit estimation. KLIPS data 2002-2016.
(1. All) (2. All) (3. Females) (4. Females) (5. Males) (6. Males)
No income
control
Income
control
No income
control
Income
control
No income
control
Income
control
Subjectively
overeducated
Very Satisfied -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***
Satisfied -0.176*** -0.154*** -0.136*** -0.093*** -0.190*** -0.171***
Neither 0.162*** 0.144*** 0.125*** 0.088*** 0.175*** 0.159***
Dissatisfied 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.018*** 0.014***
Very Dissatisfied 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000***
18 For comparison purposes, Table A1 in the Appendix shows the same table for the subjective measure of overeducation.
Here, we simply note no substantial difference for the main variables of interest.
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Objectively
overeducated
Very Satisfied -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***
Satisfied -0.125*** -0.119*** -0.086*** -0.070*** -0.132*** -0.120***
Neither 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.117*** 0.109***
Dissatisfied 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.013***
Very Dissatisfied 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000***
Objectively
overeducated II
Very Satisfied -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002***
Satisfied n/a n/a -0.094*** -0.085*** -0.141*** -0.124***
Neither 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.129*** 0.116***
Dissatisfied 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.011***
Very Dissatisfied 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000***
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 5 presents the marginal effects associated with overeducation. The main changes
reflect individuals less likely to be satisfied with life and more likely to be neither satisfied
nor dissatisfied with life. This is the case for both genders and whether income is controlled
for or not. For individuals who are either very satisfied or very dissatisfied with life, there is
negligible change with respect to being overeducated rather than not overeducated (and
vice versa). This result supports the similar finding of the top end of the distribution that
there is little movement at the extremes of the well-being distribution found by Salinas-
Jiménez et al. (2016).
The marginal effects of Table 5 also highlight that Korean males are more affected by
overeducation than females. This is in line with the arguments advanced in section 2: males,
in a male dominated society with more opportunities and better pay than females, suffer
more when their investments in education are not sufficiently rewarded in a (favourable)
labour market; females are also affected, though the percentage changes are lower. For
both genders, controlling for income moderates the overall findings: given the considerably
lower average incomes earned by females, controlling for income has a bigger impact on the
marginal effects for being overeducated than it does for males. A claim made based on a
comparison of the changes between the third and fourth column (i.e. females) and fifth and
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sixth column (males). The last panel changes the objective overeducation industry-
occupation comparator group to only include members of the same sex: for males this
makes negligible difference whereas for females there is a minor increase in the marginal
effects obtained post-estimation. The next section discusses these results in the context of
the literature review and Korean context.
In line with the notion that the negative association with overeducation might fade over
time as more peers are also overeducated, we investigated overeducation at two different
points in time (similar to Piper, 2015, p. 10-12, which found this with British panel data). The
two points in time are 2002-2006, the first five years of available data, and 2012-2016, the
last five years of available data, at the time of writing. In most cases, the results are in line
with those of Table 5. In the early period the results are similar, as they are in the later
period for both genders together and males. An exception is found in the later period for
females, and the marginal effects (for both periods) are presented in Table 6.
Table 6: Overeducation and life satisfaction (females only), 2002-2006; 2012-2016. KLIPS
data 1998-2016.
(1. 2002-2006) (2. 2002-2006) (3. 2012-2016) (4. 2012-2016)
No income control Income control No income control Income control
Objectively
overeducated
Very Satisfied -0.004*** -0.003** -0.001** -0.000
Satisfied -0.118*** -0.097*** -0.0731** -0.049
Neither 0.093*** 0.082*** 0.071** 0.048
Dissatisfied 0.028*** 0.019*** 0.003** 0.002
Very Dissatisfied 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The key difference here is that in the more recent period, when income is controlled for,
there is no statistically significant difference between overeducated and not overeducated
females in terms of life satisfaction.19 This possibly reflects both the comparison effect and
the lower expectations of success in the labour market given gender inequality and social
norm expectations about motherhood. Females engage in higher education even though
19 The p-values for these particular marginal effects are approximately 0.16.
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they do not necessarily expect this to be rewarded in the labour market, and in the later
period they are less alone in such a situation given the increases in participation and
completion of tertiary education courses (see Figure 1), which could be an important
explanation for the found lack of statistical significance (last column of Table 6).
5. Discussion: gender inequality in Korea; limitations
“The world had changed a great deal, but the little rules, contracts and customs had not,
which meant the world hadn’t actually changed at all. [...] Do laws and institutions change
values, or do values drive laws and institutions?”
Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982, Nam-Joo, 2020, pp. 119-120
The issue of gender inequality in the labour market is particularly highlighted by the fact that
90% of top jobs are held by Korean men (World Economic Forum, 2019), and that Korea has
the largest gender pay gap among OECD member states (OECD, 2017). As already mentioned,
the country ranks very low in the Global Gender Gap Index (World Economic Forum, 2019).
Moreover, Korea has also ranked the last among all surveyed countries in The Economist’s
Glass-Ceiling-Index for many years (The Economist, 2020). It follows that while women in
Korea do tend to attain a similar or even higher level of education than their male
counterparts, their chances and opportunities in the labour market are relatively limited.20
This gender inequality was also prevalent in our study which, through the prism of
overeducation, indicated that the levels of gender inequality in Korea is a substantial
problem. Females are more successful than males, in terms of tertiary education, and find it
harder to find appropriate jobs in the country. However, the mismatch of education and
employment does not make them as unhappy as it does males. This is suggestive of both
lower individual expectations, tradition, and societal norms.21
The consequences from the discrimination of women in their everyday life and the labour
market as well as the underuse of their human resources are several, not only for individual
20 Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982: “Women don’t stay [in the company] because you make it impossible for us to stay”
(Nam-Joo, 2020, p. 85).
21 As already stated above, according to the ‘M curve’, Korean women usually leave the labour market to care
for their children (J. Kim et al., 2016), which is a reason why many employers decline to employ women despite
their high educational levels. Since the women are used to this discrimination they do not suffer that much as
their male counterparts. Another reason is the discrimination of women in society.
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workers but also for the Korean economy in general. A higher percentage of females attain
university degrees than males, but find it more difficult to find employment that rewards
their investment in their human capital.22 That females are less negatively affected by
overeducation than males, we argue, reflects two main phenomena: lower expectations, and
social norms. In a society where gender inequality is prevalent (in terms of pay, promotion
and job prospects), females do not try and do not expect to get good jobs.
This reduced life satisfaction is a problem for the individuals themselves, as well as the
companies they work for and Korea in general. The discrimination of highly educated women
in the labour market like for example the preference of employers towards male workers
who do not leave for maternity even increases the issue of overeducation in Korea. Many
well-educated Korean women struggle with finding an appropriate job after graduation, and
if they find one, they feel the discrimination through unequal payment, lower career
opportunities or sexual harassment at work.23
Korean society appears to have many gender inequalities.24 Our analysis suggests that future
research should consider the large gender gaps in Korea and its implications for individual
well-being, institutional success and economic growth among other issues of potential
relevance. Apart from discrimination of women in the labour market, a further aspect that
intensifies the issue of overeducation and its association with gender inequality in Korea is
found in Confucianism – an aspect that leads to high educational pressure and a
mismanagement of supply and demand for highly educated labour in Korea. It has also often
been argued that men’s superiority to women as well as the suppression of women in
society are deeply rooted in these cultural patterns (for example, Koh, 2008).
Already visible changes in the thinking of the Korean youth and especially women have
gained a lot of attention worldwide. Korean women use social networks or protest on the
streets in order to fight against the mistreatment of women in the country. For example,
they fight against sexual harassment and violence against women, and demand to reduce
the educational pressure put on them. Today, Korean women still take a suppressed role in
22 Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982: “Jiyoung continued to apply for work, lowering her standards in small increments
[…]” (Nam-Joo, 2020, p. 91).
23 Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982: “He found it more cost-efficient to invest in employees [men] who would last in this
work environment than to make the environment more accommodating” (Nam-Joo, 2020, p. 111).
24 The gender gap, in general, has already been a focus of recent work (Minkus, 2019; Piper, 2019).
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society, often in the obligation to obey men, be it the father or later the husband or son.
Another observation is the decreasing fertility rate in Korea. In 2018, on average, every
Korean woman had one child compared to more than six in 1960 (World Bank, 2020c).
Among the reasons are that modern Korean women want to have an independent life and
follow their career. The so-called ‘Sampo Generation’ rejects dating, marriage and childbirth
(Hwang, 2011) to protest against a life as a suppressed (house)wife, discriminated on the
labour market for their role as a women and mother. In the future, when the fertility rate
does not grow, the ageing Korean society may also affect the economy negatively (Quick and
d'Efilippo, 2019)
The Korean government already set up some government policies to improve the current
(labour market) situation. The so-called ‘Basic Plan for Gender Equality Policies’, presented
on the website of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family of the Republic of Korea, is a
plan renewed every five years in order to reduce gender inequality. Within this plan, 22
implementation strategies are presented to promote awareness on the topic of inequality,
strengthen women’s role in the labour market, improve the work-life balance and eradicate
violence against women (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2020).25
As emphasised by the OECD (2017), quotas should be introduced to help promote women in
management and political positions and use their qualifications while receiving a fair
remuneration. By strengthening their role in the labour market, the usage of women’s high
qualifications could lead to a decrease of overeducated female workers in Korea. In addition
to that, as a further effect, overeducated men would compare themselves less to men in
higher job positions as these are then not only held by men, which, in turn, could attenuate
the negative effect on their life satisfaction. Thus, one potential consequence of a more
gender equal society and labour market could be that less individuals would suffer from
overeducation and its negative effects. Whether overeducation is less present in a more
gender equal, developed society and what its effects are could be a subject for future
research.
25 Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982: “In 1999, the year Kim Eunyoung turned twenty, new legislation against gender
discrimination was introduced, and in 2001, the year Kim Jiyoung turned twenty, the Ministry of Gender
Equality was formed. But in certain pivotal moments in women’s lives, the ‘woman’ stigma reared its head to
obscure their vision, stay their hands and hold them back. The mixed signals were confusing and disconcerting"
(Nam-Joo, 2020, p. 60).
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There are some limitations to this work as some issues could not be addressed with the
KLIPS dataset. For instance, it is difficult to know if individuals who perceive themselves to
be overeducated see it as their own fault or the fault of the Korean society. These two
possibilities may have a differing relationship with well-being. Also, we do not know if
individuals choose to be overeducated on purpose, perhaps as insurance in the labour
market, or because they were previously studying their passion rather than anything that
they expected to help them secure a good job. Again, these may have different
consequences for the well-being of the overeducated. In general, the overeducated are likely
to be heterogeneous and we rely on average effects for our results. We might learn who the
overeducated compare themselves with and explore the well-being associations for different
comparison groups. A qualitative study where the overeducated are interviewed may
supplement this research and find nuance that we might miss. Given the dataset, we were
unable to address the possibility that individuals with a migration background may find it
harder to secure work which suits their education, perhaps due to labour market
discrimination or unrecognised qualifications (Wen and Maani, 2018; Bijedić and Piper,
2019). The overeducated may be pushed into self-employment, or may even leave Korea to
take up more fitting employment abroad.26 Information about children is seemingly complex
in the KLIPS dataset, though none of the results are any different with the additional
inclusion of a control for children in the household. Motherhood thus remains an interesting
issue for future research to address.
6. Conclusion
Overeducated Koreans are less satisfied with life than those not overeducated. Furthermore,
this lower life satisfaction is stronger for males than females. Such a result is consistent with
males having higher expectations from the labour market than females. Despite females
being better educated, in general, they suffer from labour market (and other) discrimination
as recorded by organisations including the OECD, the World Economic Forum’s Gender Gap
Index, and The Economist (see references elsewhere). This finding is quite robust, being
consistent with (objective) overeducation being calculated in different ways considering
26 As mentioned in the Introduction, thousands of Koreans take part in the ‘K-Move’ program which helps the
young graduates to find a job abroad (Kim, 2018).
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combinations of occupation, industry, year and gender, and held whether the sample was
restricted to younger individuals or no age restrictions. How income was treated (individual
pre-tax, individual post-tax, household), nor the inclusion or exclusion of subjective health
status or whether they live in a household with children also did not affect the key findings.
Like other investigators, we find a substantial size difference between these different ways
of measuring overeducation. Those who feel themselves to be subjectively overeducated
have a larger negative association with life satisfaction than those who are classified as
objectively overeducated (in comparison to the respective not overeducated categories). In
our study, the role of income provides a further example of the danger in relying on just one
method of measuring overeducation. For females, their much lower average income appears
to explain somewhat the (subjective) self-reporting that the demands of their job are too
low for the education they have. For males, income makes only a negligible difference. In
contrast, those overeducated according to the various (objective) realised matches
measures are paid considerably more than the not objectively overeducated (see Table 2),
and are only slightly compensated by this larger salary regardless of gender. In general, and
in line with the discussion of sections 1 and 2, we find that males have, ceteris paribus and
on average, a larger negative association with being overeducated than females, a result
concomitant with lower expectations induced by discrimination, despite the higher average
level of education. The differences between objective overeducation and subjective
overeducation also support a conclusion based upon expectations. Social norms may also
reinforce this inequality.
Through this study, it becomes clear that the issue of overeducation in Korea is a very
serious one that cannot be solved without addressing the presence of significant gender
inequalities in the country. A more level playing field between males and females may
attenuate the reduction in life satisfaction felt by males (due to less expectations of a good
job and being the breadwinner) and help the Korean economy and society by better utilising
the human capital of the well-educated female population. Both, society in general and the
government must change their mindset and enforce stronger to help and encourage Korean
women better integrate into society and the labour market. If not, Korean graduates
(especially women) will continue to invest high amounts of time and money in education
that cannot be used, or leave the country in order to find a good job which will have
demographic as well as economic consequences for Korea.
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Appendix 1
Table A1: Life Satisfaction and Subjective Overeducation. Ordered Probit Analysis Results.
KLIPS data 1998-2016.
(1. All) (2. All) (3. Females) (4. Females) (5. Males) (6. Males)
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Life
Satisfaction
Overeducated -0.416***
(0.018)
-0.374***
(0.022)
-0.347***
(0.029)
-0.232***
(0.037)
-0.437***
(0.022)
-0.417***
(0.028)
Years of
Schooling
0.128***
(0.003)
0.109***
(0.004)
0.125***
(0.006)
0.102***
(0.007)
0.128***
(0.004)
0.107***
(0.005)
Real Income 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.137*** 0.135*** 0.182*** 0.152*** 0.134*** 0.143***
(0.020) (0.029) (0.031) (0.043) (0.029) (0.043)
Age squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married 0.489*** 0.461*** 0.431*** 0.449*** 0.516*** 0.464***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.028) (0.032) (0.021) (0.024)
Separated -0.435*** -0.376** -0.297 -0.085 -0.725*** -0.978***
(0.143) (0.167) (0.188) (0.217) (0.221) (0.263)
Divorced -0.273*** -0.342*** -0.310*** -0.320*** -0.307*** -0.529***
(0.071) (0.078) (0.093) (0.104) (0.109) (0.121)
Widowed -0.643** -0.696* -0.549 -0.677 -1.129* -0.882
(0.306) (0.379) (0.347) (0.428) (0.641) (0.797)
Constant cut1 -0.895** -1.052* 0.375 -0.516 -1.290** -1.036
(0.440) (0.570) (0.677) (0.931) (0.596) (0.778)
Constant cut2 0.458 0.308 1.686** 0.934 0.097 0.302
(0.438) (0.566) (0.674) (0.922) (0.593) (0.774)
Constant cut3 2.560*** 2.432*** 3.752*** 3.010*** 2.234*** 2.480***
(0.438) (0.566) (0.674) (0.923) (0.593) (0.775)
Constant cut4 5.151*** 5.151*** 6.369*** 5.749*** 4.818*** 5.218***
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(0.439) (0.567) (0.676) (0.924) (0.594) (0.776)
Observations 25,262 22,398 10,427 8,947 14,835 13,451
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference category:
single. Estimates also includes region and year dummy variables.
Appendix 2
Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982 by Cho Nam-Joo: about the novel
Kim Jiyoung is the central figure in the book ‘Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982’, a bestseller in Korea,
China, Taiwan and Japan, written by Cha Yam-Noo. The book was published in Korea in 2016,
and later translated into 18 languages as well as made into a film. The English translation of
the novel was published in February 2020. Showing the struggles of a young woman living in
modern Korea and the way gender inequality affects nearly every aspect of women’s lives in
the country, the book struck a chord with Koreans. The fictional character became a symbol
for gender inequality and sexual harassment, as Kim Jiyoung (the Korean equivalent for ‘Jane
Doe’) could represent any Korean women.
The book’s sales indicate its popularity: ‘Kim Jiyoung, Born 1982’ is the first Korean book
within a decade to sell more than one million copies. As part of the Korean version of the
#MeToo movement, it helped move gender inequality centre stage in cultural and political
discourse in Korea. After its publication the novel started and informed several debates
about gender differences and women’s rights in the country. Female politicians and
celebrities (for example K-pop stars) started to talk about the novel in public, creating more
awareness of the topic of gender discrimination in Korea; a topic seemingly previously
ignored for a long time. The novel has also been, famously in Korea, discussed in political
circles.
Reports indicate that the film version of the book led to couples breaking up as well as angry
responses from males dismissing the discrimination of women in their country, with many
counter movements still not accepting the reality of women’s suffering in Korea. Gender
inequality in the country also becomes revealed through the reactions of the public to the
novel and its subsequent film. On the popular film rating platform Naver Movie men
awarded its film 2.72 points out of 10 whereas women rated it on average with 9.51 points
(39,836 online users). The novel itself provoked a failed crowd-funding campaign for a male
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version called ‘Kim Jihoon, Born 1990’ intending to show the discriminations men are face in
the country. Through the film, and the recent translations of the novel, the debate it has
inspired about gender inequality in Korea has spread to other countries and continents and
gets more and more attention worldwide.
